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1. Introduction 
In many major cities traffic related externalities are growing with pollution, accidents, noise 
and congestion as the major causes for concern. The externalities are often divided into 
atmospheric type and congestion type with traffic-congestion being the major contributor to 
last group. Removing the problems with negative externalities altogether seems unrealistic 
and the best the policy makers can hope for is to reduce the externalities to levels acceptable 
by the public. 
If one looks at the transport sector it is easily seen that time is a very important factor in 
everything that goes on. This is because transport itself almost never is consumed alone. 
Transport is part of other activities or one could say that transport is only conducted in order 
for other activities to be made possible. 
In the economic literature the link between activities and the use of time was modeled 
explicitly in Becker (1965). Here it is assumed that the consumption of market produced 
commodities alone is not the source of utility. Instead the households produce consumption 
goods by combining household time and market produced commodities and it is these goods 
that give utility. This way of thinking is in line with the ideas behind activity based transport 
modeling and some papers have utilized the Becker-like approach when valuing time in 
transport (e.g. DeSerpa (1971), Jara-Diaz (2003)). 
The tax system is one of the instruments a government have when trying to control the 
externality problem and the optimal tax system for the transport sector has been analyzed 
extensively in the literature (see for example Mayeres & Proost (1997), Mayeres & Proost 
(2001), Parry & Bento (2002) and De Borger & Van Dender (2003)). Unfortunately all these 
approaches fail to take account of the insights pointed out in Becker (1965) that the allocation 
of household time matters. A recent paper (Kleven (2004)) has shown that the rules for 
optimal taxation needs modification if time is implemented (using the Becker approach). 
However, Kleven (2004) does not deal with externalities which are crucial if the theory is to 
be applied in the transport sector. This problem was addressed in Nielsen and Pilegaard 
(2004) in the case of atmospheric externalities. In the present paper we implement congestion 
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externalities in the model, which explicitly model the use of time and to derive the rules for 
optimal taxation.  
    The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and describes the behavior of 
the households, the government and some useful mathematical derivations. Section 3 derives 
rules for optimal taxation and section 4 concludes. 
2. The Model 
We assume that there are N+1 commodities and H households in the economy. Households 
do not consume commodities bought in the market directly. Instead they undertake a 
production where market produced commodities X and household time L is used to produce 
consumption goods Z using a production process f (this follows Becker (1965)). The 
government seeks to maximize a Bergson-Samuelson type social welfare function 
W=W(V1,..., VH) where the utility of each household enters the social welfare function and it 
has to raise a revenue R by taxing marked produced commodities X. 
2.1 The households 
To ensure the existence an optimum each household has a utility function with standard 
properties given by  
0 1( , ,..., , ), 1,...,
h h h h h
NU U Z Z Z G h H= =  
where ( , )h i h hi i iZ f X L=  , i=0,...,N represents the way good hiZ  is being produced in household 
h using one market good hiX , time
h
iL  and production technology f
i. We let 
1
( )H hNhG G Z== ∑  
describe the externality in the economy.  We restrict the analysis to negative externalities 
(thus 0U G∂ ∂ <  and G′>0). It is assumed that it is the total consumption of ZN and not only the 
consumption of market commodity XN that causes externalities. Considering transport as the 
main example in this paper it is the intuitive choice. It is assumed that the production 
technology is Leontief and that every household uses the same technology in the production 
of Zi (for a discussion of the fixed coefficient technology see DeSerpa (1971) and DeSerpa 
(1975)). Intuitively this means that if a household want to go on a trip across the Great Belt in 
Denmark they have to buy a ticket and allocate time for the trip. One could argue that more 
than one market good could be required in the production which would result in X being a 
vector of these market goods, but to keep things as simple as possible we here assume that 
only one market good goes into the production of every consumption good. The households 
are restricted in their choices by time and money. Letting Pi and wh represent market prices 
for commodity i and household wage they therefore seeks to maximize Uh subject to the 
constraints 
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where Th is the time allocated to work and T  is the total time available to the household. 
Realizing that the constraints are interdependent through Th we utilize the Leontief 
technology and write 
0
( , )
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h h h h
i i i
i
Q P w Z w T
=
=∑  
where 
( , ) , 0,...,h h i hi i Xi LiQ P w P a w a i N= + =  
with 
h
i
h
i
X
Xi Za =  and hi hiLLi Za = . Note that these coefficients are fixed and identical for all 
households since they face the same production technologies. The simplified households 
optimization problem are thus given by 
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where h hI w T=  is the households full income. Note that ( , )h hi iQ P w  is the total opportunity 
cost of consuming one unit of Zi for household h consisting of the price of marked produced 
commodities used in the production process and the value of foregone earnings. Assuming 
that the number of households H is large, we make the standard assumption that the individual 
household behaves as if 0h
N
G
Z
∂
∂ =  which means that the households either think that their 
behavior does not affect the externality or that they may realize that they affects it but regards 
its contribution as insignificant. This allows us to characterize the optimal solution by the 
indirect utility function Vh and the ordinary demand functions for hiZ . We write these as 
0 1
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( , ,..., , )
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h h h h h
i N
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Letting hkZ%  represent the compensated demand for good k we know that the Slutsky equation 
and Roy’s Identity are given by 
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where λh is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint of the simplified 
household optimization problem thus representing the marginal utility of extra income for 
household h. 
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2.2 The Government 
Assuming that the production side of the economy operates under constant returns to scale 
and is fully competitive the producer prices for commodities are fixed and given by pi. 
Defining the tax on commodities as 
, 0,...,i i it P p i N= − =  
thus gives the government full control over the price vector for commodities. Knowing the 
households problem the government thus seeks to solve 
0 1 0 1 1, ,...,
0 1
1 1
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=
= =
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where we assume that aX0=0 so that good 0 becomes pure leisure and thus untaxable (see 
Munk (2002) for a discussion of pure leisure). With the assumption of pure leisure in the 
model we can no longer tax in a first-best way and the optimal tax system therefore becomes 
second-best. With the assumptions made the characterization of the optimal tax system will be 
given by the first order conditions to the governments’ optimization problem. 
2.3 Helpful derivations and definitions 
Before the rules for optimal taxation is derived it is useful to make some derivations and 
definitions. First we need to derive an expression for
k
G
P
∂ ∂ , which is the effect of a price 
change in the level of the externality. Since the externality is caused by the consumption of 
good N we divide the effect of a price change on the demand for this good in the direct price 
effect and an externality effect. This gives 
|
h h h h
N N k N
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The change in the level of the externality as a result of the change in Pk is given by 
1
'
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Combining these expressions gives 
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is the externality feed-back effect which is in line with the feedback-effect in Mayeres & 
Proost (1997). The role of the feedback-effect in the optimal tax problem is clear. Since we 
seek a way to internalize the externality and also raise a certain amount of revenue the 
introduction of an environmental tax will change the level of the externality since the 
households price vector is changing. This change in the price vector will cause a change in the 
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households' behavior thus changing the externality level which again will change the behavior 
of the households. It is this effect that is called the feedback-effect. The intuition becomes 
very clear if traveling by car in a congested city is considered. Imagine that the government 
seeks to solve the congestion problem by introducing road pricing. Making it more expensive 
in monetary terms to drive in the city will make some drivers stay out of the city thus 
reducing the level of congestion. The reduction of congestion will make car transport more 
attractive to other car users thus raising the level of congestion. The feedback-effect captures 
this and is thus very important to include if one wish to find the optimal level of taxation in an 
economy with congestion externalities. 
    Letting μ be the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the government budget constraint 
we follow Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and Diamond (1975)  and define the social marginal 
utility of income βh and the net social marginal utility of income bh for household h as 
1
h h
h
hh N
h i
i Xi h
i
W
V
Zb t a
I
β λ
β
μ =
∂= ∂
∂= + ∂∑
 
We see that βh is the direct social value of increasing the budget for household h. But an 
increase in the households' budget will result in a change in the household behavior and thus 
the tax payments. The second term in the definition of bh captures this effect and it is 
therefore the net social marginal utility of income for household h. Note that βh is measured in 
household income and bh is measured in government revenue. 
3. Tax Rules 
To derive the optimal tax rules in this economy we assume that the first order conditions for 
the government’s optimization problem characterizes the optimal tax structure (see Myles 
(1995) chapter 4 for a discussion of this assumption). The Lagrangian is given by 
1 2
1 1
( , ,..., ) ( )
N H
H i h
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i h
L W V V V t a Z Rμ
= =
= + −∑ ∑  
which can be shown to give the first order conditions for the optimal tax 
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for all k=1,…,N. We now define γ as the marginal cost to society of a change in the 
externality level G. This consists of the direct welfare effect 1
1
h
h
H
W V
GV
h
μ
∂ ∂
∂∂=
∑  which measures the 
welfare loss to society in governments’ revenue and an indirect revenue effect 
1 1
h
i
N H
Zi
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i h
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which is the change in revenue due to changes in the tax payments caused by the externality. 
We therefore have that 
1
1 1 1
hh i
h
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and we can express the first order condition as 
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This version of the first order condition will be the starting point in the rest of the paper. 
3.1 Inverse elasticity rule and the inverse factor share rule 
    The inverse elasticity rule (see Sandmo (1976) for an introduction) emerge in its most 
simple form when we assume that all households are identical, no compensated cross-price 
elasticitites exist, that no externalities are present (that is G=0) together with aXk=1, k=1,…,N. 
This reduces the optimal tax rules to 
, 1,...,k
k k
t k N
P
θ
ε= =
&
%  
where 
1
N
i
i
i
Zt
I
λ μθ μ =
∂−= + ∂∑&  is a constant since it is independent of k and kε%  is the 
compensated own price elasticity for good k. The interpretation of the inverse elasticity rule is 
straightforward. We know that introducing taxes in the economy distort the price vector. This 
distortion will change the consumption pattern so that the real cost to society of raising a 
revenue R is larger than R. The optimal tax system should therefore be constructed in such a 
way that this cost of raising government revenue is reduced and this is done by taxing 
commodities with low compensated elasticity at higher rates than commodities with high 
elasticities. 
    To derive the inverse factor share rule (Kleven (2004)) in its simplest form we allow aXk to 
differ from 1. In this case we can write 
, 1,...,k
k Xk k
t k N
P a
θ
ε= =
&
%  
As pointed out in Kleven (2004) this rule is very intuitive since the distortions caused by 
taxation often comes from the reduction in working time and increase in leisure time. In the 
present setup the distortion comes from the fact that households switch from market use of 
time to non-market use of time. That is, the distortion is caused by the households increasing 
their level of time used for leisure, or more correctly they increase their use of time spend 
inside the household thus avoiding the tax payments. If we accept that even activities inside 
the household often requires some level of marked produced commodities (which is one of 
the key assumptions here) the inverse factor share rule says that those commodities which are 
very time consuming in the household production process should be taxed at a higher rate 
than less time consuming commodities. Applying this to the transport sector it says that two 
modes which only differ in their speed should be taxed such that the fast mode is taxed less 
than the slow mode. Unfortunately the possibility of negative externalities is ignored and this 
is also recognized by Kleven. Since negative externalities are one of the main reasons for 
introducing road pricing we have to extend the model to include these if we want to apply 
optimal tax theory it in the transport sector. 
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3.2 Ramsey Rule 
    The Standard Ramsey rule for optimal taxation emerges in its simplest form if we assume 
that all households in the economy are identical (that is bn=b) and ignore the externalities 
(G=0). In that case we can define Mirrlees Index of Discouragement dk (Mirrlees (1976)) as 
 
1
N
k
i Xi
i i
k
k
Zt a
Qd
Z
=
∂
∂=
∑ %
 
    The index of discouragement for good k tells how much the compensated demand for this 
good is changed if the price vector is reduced as a result of a change in the tax system. Using 
the definition of dk the first order condition can be written as 
( 1)kd b= −  
This rule calls for tax rates to be set at levels which ensure that the proportionate reduction in 
the compensated demand for all taxable goods is identical which is the Ramsey rule. 
3.3 Additivity property 
The additivity property derived in Sandmo (1975) also emerges in the present setup under the 
assumption of no cross-price elasticities. With this assumption the first order condition 
reduces to 
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The interpretation of these tax rules are not straight forward, but essentially it separates the 
Ramsey part of the tax problem from the Pigouvian part, stating that firstly the taxes should 
be set so that the externalities are internalized and secondly the taxes should be adjusted to 
meet the revenue requirement in the most efficient way. In the special case of identical 
households and additive separable externalities (which eliminates the feedback-effect) these 
tax rules simplifies to the results from Nielsen and Pilegaard (2004) giving 
1( ) , 1,..., 1
1 ' 1( ) ,
k
k Xk k
k
k
k Xk k Xk
t k N
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P Q
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μ α ε
λ μ
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which allows us to gain some new theoretical insight into the optimal tax problem in the 
transport sector. The formulas for optimal taxation consist of three elements. The first ( 1
Xkα ) 
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is the inverse factor share rule and the second ( 1
kε% ) is the inverse elasticity rule both discussed 
above. The last element ( ' 1k
Xk
HV
Qμ α ) is the additive term on the externality generating good. 
With no explicit modeling of time (e.g. having αXk=1 for all k) it is just the standard additive 
term found in Sandmo (1975) saying that the extra tax should be set according to the principle 
for Pigouvian taxation. This no longer holds as the term 1
Xkα  enters the formula. The tax rule 
states that the social planner has to account for the time allocation by subsidizing time saving 
activities even if these activities generate negative externalities. 
Implications 
Using the rules from section 3 as a guide for the design of the tax system several insights 
emerge. We see that if no compensated cross-price effects exist the simple inverse elasticity 
rule and the inverse factor share rule apply together with the additivity property. Furthermore 
the fact that we are having congestion externalities in the economy should not affect the 
efficiency part of the tax rules. It only affect the externality (or Pigouvian) term of the tax 
formula. With cross-price effects present in the model we have to use the more complicated 
Ramsey tax rule. This says that the optimal tax rates should be set so that the reduction in 
compensated demand is equal for all goods. 
4. Concluding remarks 
It was shown that the rules for optimal taxation with externalities need modification when 
time allocation is modeled explicitly. This insight is especially relevant for the transport 
sector. The conclusion is that a transport mode which saves time should be taxed less than 
other modes even if these generate the same or possibly even a higher level of atmospheric 
externality. The obvious example is the discussion of taxes on busses and cars. When ignoring 
the time allocation the transport modes should carry the same level of externality tax if their 
external damage costs are the same. Here this conclusion is no longer valid per se. If the car is 
faster than the bus it should carry a lower externality tax. The argument that cars, due to their 
higher environmental damage, should be taxed higher than busses thus looses some of its 
appeal in the present setup and since cars actually might save time they should have their 
corrective tax reduced to a level below the pure Pigouvian tax rate. 
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